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ABSTRACT. This paper proposes a theoretical analysis of the joint impact of foreign aid
and oil taxes on the revenues of a rich oil importing country (North) and a two-class, oil
exporting country (South). Without coordination, oil taxes are strictly higher in the North
and the global allocation of oil is inefficient. Moreover, oil taxes in the North extract some
of the South’s oil rents, undoing the revenue transfers from foreign aid. We show that a
policy coordination mechanism reduces inefficiencies and improves global welfare.
1. Introduction
Among the hottest policy issues currently discussed by global leaders in
national legislations and international summits, foreign aid and oil tax-
ation occupy a fairly important place. Persistent revenue discrepancies
between high- and low-income countries sustain a demand for higher
international redistribution through foreign aid. Important budget deficits
faced by many high-income countries in the wake of the global economic
crisis, as well as environmental concerns, are likely to lead to tax increases,
in particular, taxes on oil products. These taxes affect the revenues of oil
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exporting countries, some of which are low-income countries and recipi-
ents of foreign aid. The joint impact of aid and oil taxes on the revenues
of both developed and developing countries needs to be understood and
taken into account by policy makers in order to avoid inefficiencies result-
ing from policies offsetting the effects of each other. This paper analyzes the
interaction of oil-rich and oil-poor countries via oil taxation and foreign aid
policies and shows that an inefficiency arises from lack of coordination.
Industrialized countries collect considerable fiscal revenues by highly
taxing oil products. The part consisting of taxes in the final price of a barrel
was around 45 per cent in the G7 countries in 2007 (OPEC, 2008). These
fiscal revenues represent 6.5 per cent of governments’ earnings in the EU15
and 6 per cent in the OECD (International Energy Agency, 2001). However,
these taxes capture a part of oil producing countries’ rents. According to
the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), G7’s fis-
cal revenues from oil products taxation between 2003 and 2007, US$ 2,585
billion, exceeded oil producers’ US$ 2,539 billion revenues (OPEC, 2008).
These figures suggest, for example, that during this period the G7 captured
around US$ 15 billion per year from the oil revenues of a country such as
Nigeria, which produces 3 per cent of the oil consumed in the world.1
Many oil producers are low- or middle-income countries with important
inequality levels. The average per capita Gross National Income (GNI) in
the 19 countries with the largest crude oil reserves per capita was less than
US$ 5,800 in 2005 (PennWell Corporation, 2004; World Bank, 2010). In these
countries, oil rents often benefit a small, powerful group, while the rest of
the population remains poor. In Nigeria, for example, 70 per cent of the
population live on less than one dollar a day. In 2006, this country received
nearly US$ 10 billion of foreign aid from the G7 (OECD, 2010). This amount
is comparable with our estimation of US$ 15 billion captured by the G7
from Nigeria through oil taxes. In the same year, the G7 disbursed US$ 114
million to Algeria, US$ 94 million to Ecuador, US$ 48 million to Iran and
US$ 25 million to Venezuela (OECD, 2010).
Oil taxes are very low or even negative in low-income oil producing
countries. For example, in Nigeria, Algeria, Iran and Venezuela, oil is sub-
sidized. The gap in the oil tax rates between developed oil consuming
countries and developing oil producing countries is statistically significant
(Bacon, 2001).
The gap in oil tax rates between high-income oil consuming countries
and low-income oil producing countries leads to inefficiencies in the global
allocation of oil. When the final price of oil differs across regions, oil is not
used where it is most productive.
The situation depicted above suggests a lack of coordination between
rich oil consuming countries and poor oil producing countries. High oil
taxes in rich countries distort the allocation of oil and take back through
fiscal revenues some of the foreign aid transfers to those poor countries.
1 This estimation is based on the assumption that the share of Nigerian oil in the
consumption of the G7 countries is the same as its share in world consumption,
i.e., 3 per cent.
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This paper proposes a theoretical framework capturing the stylized facts
described above and suggests a welfare improving policy coordination
mechanism. The theoretical framework is based on standard assumptions
borrowed from development and resource economics literatures.
Development economists have extensively studied the motivations and
the impact of foreign aid in the past decades. They have shown that
aid is given for a combination of altruistic and self-interest motives, the
weight between the two varying with the donor (Alesina and Dollar, 2000;
Berthelemy, 2006). The altruistic motivation is related to a moral demand
for redistribution when income gaps are important. In this context, foreign
aid plays a similar role at the international level to progressive income
taxes and social security institutions at the national level (Mosley, 1987).
The selfish motivation for aid giving is the defense of the donors’ own
interests. These interests can be geopolitical (Alesina and Dollar, 2000;
Stone, 2004; Dreher and Jensen, 2007), commercial (Fleck and Kilby, 2006;
Villanger, 2006) or security related (Azam and Thelen, 2008). Lahiri et al.
(2002) suggest another selfish trade related motive for aid: aid may reduce
the recipient’s optimal tariff. Then, tying the aid to a reduction in the recip-
ient’s tariff is Pareto improving. In contrast, the present paper suggests aid
and the donor’s tariff to be complementary for achieving some redistribu-
tion objective. As we shall see, tying the donor’s tariff to the redistributive
objective will then turn out to be Pareto improving. Following Azam and
Laffont (2003), we assume a purely altruistic motivation for aid giving and
we model foreign aid as a lump sum transfer that reduces the donor’s
revenues and increases those of the recipient by the same amount. In this
paper, aid has no other impact than revenue redistribution from the donor
to the recipient. In particular, it does not affect the recipient country’s
policies or growth rate.2
Resource economists have extensively studied the effects of non-
renewable resource taxation using dynamic models of resource depletion.3
Some scholars have focused on the redistributive impact of such taxes.
The seminal paper by Bergstrom (1982) shows that, by taxing oil con-
sumption, oil consuming countries can extract the entire oil rent from an
oil producing country which is not using the resource itself: specifically,
a constant ad valorem tax applied on the entire consumption of a cost-
lessly extracted non-renewable resource induces the producer price (unit
resource rent) to decrease while affecting neither the final price, nor the
extracted quantity, at any date. The fixity of reserves gives consumption
taxes a rent capturing dimension. Brander and Djajic (1983) show that this
rent-extraction ability is mitigated if oil producers can use the resource
themselves. Sinn (2008) makes it clear that the strong distributional effect
2 Many authors have tried to assess the impact of foreign aid on recipients’ policies
(Svensson, 2003; Easterly, 2005; Kilby, 2005) and growth (e.g., Burnside and Dollar,
2000; Hansen and Tarp, 2001; Easterly, 2003), but their findings are contradictory
and there is currently no consensus on these questions.
3 Examples of these analyses are Dasgupta and Heal (1979), Dasgupta et al. (1981)
and Gaudet and Lasserre (1990).
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of oil taxation stems from the inelasticity of the resource supply induced
by the exhaustibility constraint. This literature convincingly accounts for
the gap between oil tax rates in oil importing and oil exporting regions and
for the related rent capture by the former at the expense of the latter. This
reasoning is robust to the introduction of environmental considerations.
Amundsen and Scho¨b (1999) show that the incentives of oil importing
countries to overtax oil use remain even if the resource use generates a
flow of local pollution. Daubanes and Grimaud (2010) consider the case of
a global stock of pollution. In this paper we abstract from pollution exter-
nalities generated by oil use in order to focus on the redistributive effect of
taxes. Under some restrictions, Bergstrom’s (1982) exposition highlights the
isomorphism between the tax competition problem in a Hotelling model
and in a static model where oil supply is perfectly inelastic. Following
Bergstrom and the above conventional literature on the issue, we adopt a
dynamic representation of oil extraction.4 On top of the inter-country het-
erogeneity in oil endowments examined by this environmental economics
literature, we consider intra-country heterogeneity, i.e., the coexistence of
rich resource holders and poor workers in the oil producing country. More-
over, we introduce international altruism and international redistribution
instruments.
We formalize the interactions between a rich oil importing country
(North) and a poor oil exporting country (South) using a dynamic gen-
eral equilibrium model of resource depletion. The model is based on the
following assumptions. Both countries produce a final good using labor
and oil. The North is composed of high-productivity workers, while the
South is composed of low-productivity workers and oil owners. Northern
workers are altruistic towards southern workers. The policy instruments
used by the authorities are oil taxes and foreign aid. We show that, without
coordination, the northern government overtaxes oil, extracts rents from
the southern oil owners and disburses foreign aid to the southern workers.
After investigating the inefficiencies of this equilibrium, we show that a
coordination mechanism that consists of a contract proposed by the north-
ern authorities to the southern authorities can correct them. Through such
a contract, northern authorities reduce taxes on oil from the South. This
increases global output due to a more efficient allocation of oil. It also
reduces northern fiscal revenues and leaves higher rents to the oil owners.
As a counterpart, southern authorities redistribute the additional oil rents
to the southern workers, thus reducing the need for foreign aid. We show
that this redistribution scheme increases efficiency and is Pareto improving.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The model is presented in
section 2. The general equilibrium for given policy instruments is solved
in section 3. The choice of oil tax rates and foreign aid by the governments
4 Clearly, a static model would deliver the same message; however, to the extent
that the distributional effects of taxes on endogenously extracted Hotelling
resources arise from the long-run fixity of reserves but not from any assumption
that short-run supply elasticity is zero, the static short-cut may be confusing about
the real nature of those effects. It is on this ground that the literature has generally
preferred the Hotelling representation.
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in the absence of coordination is examined in section 4. The coordination
mechanism is presented in section 5. Section 6 discusses a number of real
world issues that are absent from our model. Finally, section 7 concludes.
2. The model
At each date t ≥ 0, one final good is produced in both countries using labor
and oil. The aggregate production functions are5
Yi = (Ai Li )1−α Rαi , 0 < α < 1, i = N , S, (1)
where Ai is an index of labor productivity, Li is the quantity of labor
employed and Ri is the quantity of oil used by the final sector firms of
country i .
The index of labor productivity in the South is a constant fraction of that
in the North. The growth rate of these indexes is exogenously given and
constant:6,7
AN = A, AS = ϕA, with 1 ≥ ϕ > 0, gA = x and A(0) = A0 > 0, given.
(2)
Oil is extracted at no cost from a finite initial stock Q0:
Q˙ = −(RN + RS), Q(0) = Q0 > 0, given. (3)
The northern population is composed of L N identical agents who are
each endowed with one unit of labor. The southern population is composed
of one group of L S workers (southern poor) who are each endowed with
one unit of labor and one group of resource holders (southern rich) who
own the oil stock Q0. The size of the latter group is normalized to unity.
The population of each group, and thus their labor quantity, is assumed to
be constant over time; there is no inter-group mobility.8
5 For the sake of notational simplicity, the time argument of each variable is
dropped as long as this does not create ambiguity.
6 We denote by X˙ the derivative of any variable X with respect to time t and by
qx = x˙x its growth rate over time.
7 The symmetric treatment of technical progress in both countries, reflected by the
common growth rate x of labor productivity indexes, can be seen as the coun-
terpart of the assumption of stationarity in partial models. It avoids the issue of
convergence between rich and poor countries, and its multiple facets. In a simi-
lar setting where growth is endogenously driven by research and development in
the North, Daubanes and Grimaud’s (2010) analysis shows that the assumption
in (2) results from a diffusion process such that the time between an innovation in
the North and its availability in the South is constant. The presence of a resource-
rich, aid recipient country implies that, in a more realistic setting, account must be
taken of resource curse and aid curse theories; such matters are beyond the scope
of the present paper.
8 Given the assumption in (2) that labor productivity indexes grow at a common
rate, one could easily extend the model to exhibit a common growth rate of
population sizes.
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All individuals are infinitely lived. The instantaneous consumption lev-
els of the northern workers, the southern poor and the southern rich are
respectively denoted by CN , CS P and CS R . The lifetime preferences of the
representative agents of each group are represented by the utility functions:
UN =
∫ ∞
0
[L N ln(CN /L N ) + δL S ln(CS P/L S)]e−ρt dt, (4)
US P =
∫ ∞
0
[L S ln(CS P/L S)]e−ρt dt, (5)
US R =
∫ ∞
0
[ln(CS R)]e−ρt dt, (6)
where 0 < ρ < 1 is the intertemporal discount rate common to all groups
and δ ≥ 0 is the altruism rate of the northern citizens towards the southern
poor.
The global constraint on the use of the final good is
YN + YS = CN + CS P + CS R . (7)
There are world competitive markets for the final good and for oil, a world
competitive financial market and local competitive labor markets.9 The
final good price is normalized to unity and we denote by p, r , wN and wS ,
the world oil price, the interest rate and the wages in the North and South
respectively.
We assume that the northern government represents the northern citi-
zens whereas the southern government only represents the resource hold-
ers, who constitute an elite close to the power.10 The governments seek to
maximize the utility function of the group they represent.
The authorities can impose constant11 ad valorem taxes on the local use
of oil. We denote the oil tax rates by θi > −1, i = N , S. Then, the consumer
9 In general, monopoly power is hardly exercised in non-renewable resource mar-
kets. Stiglitz (1976) shows that it cannot be exercised at all in a Hotelling model
where demand is isoelastic, with constant demand elasticity, and where extrac-
tion costs are nil. The demand for the resource implied by the Cobb–Douglas
production function (1) being isoelastic, as can be also seen from (8), Stiglitz’s
two conditions are satisfied in our analysis. Hence, our results are robust to the
introduction of market power in the extraction sector.
10 The assumption that the developing country’s authorities put a low weight on
the welfare of the poor is common in the aid literature (e.g., Azam and Laffont,
2003; Hefeker and Michaelowa, 2005). For computational simplicity, we focus on
the extreme case where this weight is zero, but our results would remain true as
long as this weight is lower than that of the donor.
11 This assumption is made for simplicity. This follows Bergstrom (1982). His dis-
cussion on Nash equilibrium in varying strategies (p. 198) applies to our problem.
Time-dependent tax rates would affect the oil extraction path, while the govern-
ments have no interest in distorting it. In the presence of pollution, optimal tax
rates would be time varying. We refer to Daubanes and Grimaud (2010) for such
a case. Their paper suggests that the introduction of pollution externalities would
not change our results.
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oil prices are (θN + 1)p in the North and (θS + 1)p in the South. The fiscal
revenues θN pRN and θS pRS are respectively redistributed to the northern
citizens and to the southern resource holders.
Finally, we assume that the northern government can make a lump
sum transfer F(t) ≥ 0 of foreign aid to the southern poor. We assume that
foreign aid grows at the same rate as the northern citizens’ revenue.12
At date zero, the two governments set their policies non-cooperatively.
Given these policies, the decentralized equilibrium realizes from date 0
onward, which determines the lifetime utility of the three groups. The
problem must be solved by backward induction. First, we characterize the
competitive general equilibrium for given oil tax rates and foreign aid.
Second, we determine the Nash equilibrium policies.
3. Competitive general equilibrium for given policies
The final sector firms of country i = N , S maximize their profits
(Ai Li )1−α Rαi − wi Li − (θi + 1)pRi with respect to the quantity of labor
employed, Li , and the quantity of oil used, Ri . In equilibrium, the firms
equalize the marginal productivity of each input to its price:
α(Yi/Ri ) = p(θi + 1), i = N , S, (8)
(1 − α)(Yi/Li ) = wi , i = N , S. (9)
It is worth noting that a necessary condition for global optimality is
θN = θS . If the tax rates differ across countries, the national marginal oil
productivities are not equalized. Then world output could be increased by
differently allocating oil between North and South.
The extraction sector firms maximize their profits
∫∞
0 p(t)R(t)e
− ∫ t0 r(s)dsdt
with respect to the flows of extracted oil R(t), t ≥ 0, under the exhaustibility
constraint (3). In equilibrium, oil is managed as an asset and its extraction
satisfies the standard Hotelling rule:
p˙/p = r. (10)
The instantaneous budget constraints of the representative northern
citizen, southern poor and southern rich are, respectively,
CN /L N + B˙N /L N = wN + r BN /L N + θN pRN /L N − F/L N , (11)
CS P/L S + B˙S P/L S = wS + r BS P/L S + F/L S, (12)
CS R + B˙S R = p(RN + RS) + r BN + θs pRS, (13)
where Bi is group i ’s amount of financial assets, i = N , S P, S R.
12 This assumption is made for computational simplicity and is not restrictive. We
could show that the optimal level of foreign aid is always a constant fraction of
the northern citizens’ income.
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Each household maximizes its utility Ui , i = N , S P, S R, under its budget
constraint and the no-Ponzi-game necessary condition:
lim
t→∞ Bi (t)e
− ∫ t0 r(s)ds = 0, i = N , S P, S R. (14)
The first-order conditions of the households’ maximization problem lead
to the standard Ramsey-Keynes conditions:
gCN = gCS P = gCS R = r − ρ. (15)
The financial market is in equilibrium at date 0 if BN (0) + BS P (0) +
BS R(0) = 0. Under this condition, the initial debt of each group is an
arbitrary endowment. We assume that it is nil for all groups13: BN (0) =
BS P (0) = BS R(0) = 0.
Proposition 1. The following properties are satisfied in equilibrium.
1. National production levels YN and YS , as well as consumption levels
of the three groups CN , CS P and CS R , grow at the same rate g = (1 −
α)x − αρ.
2. The ratio of production levels YN /YS is a decreasing function of the
ratio of oil tax rates (θN + 1)/(θS + 1).
3. For given production levels YN and YS and a given level of foreign aid
F , θN has a positive effect on CN , a negative effect on CS R and no effect
on CS P , whereas θS has no effect on the consumption levels.
Proof. See the online Appendix.
According to the first property, the growth rate in the two countries
stems from exogenous technical progress and resource depletion but,
under our assumptions, is constant, independent of oil tax rates and of
the level of foreign aid. This equilibrium property simplifies our analysis
a good deal, since it reduces governments’ optimization problems to the
maximization of utilities at date 0.14
The second and third properties disentangle two effects of oil tax rates on
the revenues of the three groups: a location effect on national production
levels and a pure distributional effect on consumption levels.15
The location effect is that of the relative oil tax rates on the repartition of
the final good production between North and South. If oil taxes increase in
13 This is done for notational simplicity. Our results are robust to a different
assumption on the level of initial debt.
14 In a context of non-regular growth, as in Bretschger and Pittel (2008), our analysis
would not have been feasible.
15 The distributional effects of non-renewable resources taxation have been stud-
ied by Bergstrom (1982), Liski and Tahvonen (2004), Sinn (2008) and Daubanes
and Grimaud (2010), among others. In particular, the latter paper analytically
identifies the locational and distributional effects of national resource taxes.
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the North, northern firms become less competitive since one of their inputs
becomes relatively more expensive. Then northern firms will use a lower
share of oil extracted at each date. Since the other input, labor, is immobile,
a decrease in oil use implies a lower final good production. Therefore, a
unilateral increase in θN decreases YN and increases YS , with the opposite
being true for θS .
The distributional effect is that of the absolute oil tax rates on the repar-
tition of oil rents between fiscal authorities and resource holders. Oil taxes
decrease the equilibrium price of oil, transferring some of resource holders’
rents to the fiscal authorities. This transfer positively affects the consump-
tion level of northern households, who benefit from the northern fiscal
revenues, and negatively affects the consumption level of southern oil
owners, who lose rents.
Precisely, one can see from the first-order conditions (8) that the total
payment for oil by the final sector firms, p(θN + 1)RN + p(θS + 1)RS , is
equal to αYN + αYS . This payment is composed of three parts: p(RN +
RS) = α(YN /(θN + 1) + YS/(θS + 1)) is the resource holders’ oil revenue;
θN pRN = αθN YN /(θN + 1) is the northern fiscal revenue, redistributed to
the northern households; and θS pRS = αθSYS/(θS + 1) is the southern fis-
cal revenue, redistributed to the resource holders. The resource holders’
net revenue is then equal to αYN /(θN + 1) + αYS . From these expressions
we can see that, for given production levels YN and YS , the northern oil tax
θN decreases resource holders’ net revenue and increases northern house-
holds’ fiscal revenue. This is a pure distributional effect. Moreover, we can
see that θS does not influence resource holders’ revenues. The reason for
this is that θS shifts part of the oil rents into southern fiscal revenues, both
of which are earned by the resource holders. Their total revenue is therefore
not affected by this tax.
Overall, the northern tax rate θN has a negative effect on northern house-
holds’ labor earnings since it decreases northern production YN , and a
positive effect on their fiscal earnings since it increases northern fiscal rev-
enues, αθN YN /(θN + 1). The northern government will face this tradeoff
when choosing the tax rate. Moreover, the altruistic northern government
will have to take into account the positive effect of θN on the southern
workers’ labor earnings, but not its negative effect on the resource holders’
revenues.
Let us denote by CN (θN , θS, F)(t), CS P (θN , θS, F)(t) and CS R(θN , θS)(t)
the equilibrium consumption levels of the three groups at date
t as functions of the tax rates and of the level of foreign aid.
Their expressions are computed in the online Appendix, available at
http://journals.cambridge.org/EDE. The following section examines the
choice of instruments by the governments at the Nash equilibrium.
4. Equilibrium policies
In this section we assume that the northern and southern governments set
their policies non-cooperatively.
The northern government chooses the oil tax rate θN and the level
of foreign aid F(t) ≥ 0 that maximize northern agents’ lifetime utility,
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taking as given the equilibrium consumption functions CN (θN , θS, F)(t)
and CS P (θN , θS, F)(t) and the southern government’s strategy θS :
max
θN ,{F(t)}t≥0
∫ ∞
0
[
L N ln
(
CN (θN , θS, F)(t)
L N
)
+ δL S ln
(
CS P (θN , θS, F)(t)
L S
)]
× e−ρt dt
s.t. ∀t, F(t) ≥ 0.
The southern government chooses the tax rate θS which maximizes
the resource holders’ lifetime utility, taking as given the equilibrium con-
sumption function CS R(θN , θS)(t) and the northern government’s strategy
θN :
max
θS
∫ ∞
0
ln(CS R(θN , θS)(t))e−ρt dt.
From Proposition 1, CN (θN , θS, F)(t), CS P (θN , θS, F)(t) and CS R(θN , θS)
(t) grow at the same rate, which does not depend on governments’
policies. Therefore, governments’ optimization problems reduce to the
maximization of date 0 utilities (see online Appendix for formal proof).
Let us denote by θeN , θ
e
S and F
e(t) the Nash equilibrium strategies.
Proposition 2. Equilibrium policies satisfy the following properties:
1. The oil tax rate is strictly positive in the North and nil in the South:
θeN > θ
e
S = 0.
2. Foreign aid is positive if the North is sufficiently altruistic: Fe(t) > 0 if
δ > δ.
Proof. See the online Appendix.
Proposition 2 shows that, in the absence of coordination mechanisms, the
two governments set different oil tax rates. This is due to the asymmetric
oil endowments of the groups that they represent.
The southern government has no incentives to tax oil. From Proposi-
tion 1, for given production levels YN and YS , θS is neutral to the consump-
tion level of the oil owners, CS R(θN , θS)(t). The fiscal revenues that could
be collected with a positive tax rate and redistributed to the resource hold-
ers are exactly equal to the loss in oil revenue that this tax would cause
them. Moreover, we have seen that an increase in θS would shift some
final good production to the North, increasing YN with respect to YS . This
would increase the share of oil consumed by the northern firms, on which
the South levies no taxes. Taxing oil would therefore induce a net loss for
the resource holders. Hence, θeS = 0 is a dominant strategy for the south-
ern government. This is true for any northern strategy and will thus be
valid all along in the sequel. This is a noticeable difference from studies
which assume the southern government to maximize the entire surplus of
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southern residents, including workers, and where the optimal tax for the
resource exporting country is found to be negative (e.g., Bergstrom, 1982).16
The northern government can use the oil tax to capture rents from the
resource holders and transfer them to the northern citizens. From Proposi-
tion 1, for given production levels YN and YS , θN increases CN (θN , θS, F)(t)
and decreases CS R(θN , θS)(t). As northern households do not internalize
the negative effect of θN on resource holders’ consumption levels, they
would like to set the highest possible tax rate. However, we have also
seen in Proposition 1 that θN decreases northern households’ labor earn-
ings because it shifts some final good production to the South. This limits
the northern ability to capture oil rents through oil taxation. Therefore, θeN
is positive but not infinite.
The northern government can also use the oil tax to increase southern
workers’ consumption levels, since by shifting some productive activi-
ties to the South, θN increases their labor earnings. This redistribution
possibility increases the optimal tax rate for the altruistic North.
In fact, the altruistic northern government can use two redistribution
instruments to increase southern workers’ consumption levels. One the
one hand, it can use foreign aid F , which is a lump sum transfer. This
transfer decreases northern households’ consumption and increases that
of the southern workers by the same amount. On the other hand the
North can use the oil tax θN , which allows a non-lump sum transfer to the
southern poor. An increase in θN increases southern workers’ labor earn-
ings and decreases those of the northern workers, but not necessarily by
the same amount. This redistribution mechanism modifies the marginal
productivities of oil in the North and South, and is not efficiency neutral.
Figure 1 illustrates how the rate of altruism δ affects the choice of these
two redistribution mechanisms. The tax rate θ0 > 0 is the one that max-
imizes northern households’ total revenue. This tax rate is implemented
when the North is not altruistic, i.e., when δ = 0. The optimal northern tax
rate θeN increases with the altruism rate up to θ , which is implemented for
an altruism level δ = δ. For δ ≤ δ, foreign aid is nil and redistribution is
done through oil taxation, which is the cheapest redistribution instrument
on this segment. For δ > δ, θeN remains equal to θ , and F
e becomes positive
and strictly increasing with δ. On this segment, foreign aid is the cheapest
redistribution mechanism.
It is worth noting that redistributing revenues to the South by decreasing
its own competitiveness with high oil taxes may not be very attractive in a
more-than-two-country framework. In that case, high oil taxes in the North
would favor all other countries and not exclusively the targeted group of
poor. That is why, although this effect arises in our model, we will focus
on foreign aid as the main redistribution scheme, i.e., on the cases where
δ ≥ δ, θeN = θ and Fe > 0.
We show in the online Appendix that θ is defined by θ ≡
argmaxθN [CN (θN , 0, 0) + CS P (θN , 0, 0)] and δ is defined by δ ≡
CS P (θ,0,0)/L S
CN (θ,0,0)/L N
16 In this case, the gap between the northern and southern tax rates would imply a
global inefficiency in the global allocation of the resource of the same nature.
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Figure 1. Equilibrium policies
When δ > δ, the equilibrium level of foreign aid splits the total revenue of
the northern workers and the southern workers, CN (θ, 0, 0) + CS P (θ, 0, 0),
according to the weight of each group in the northern utility function:
CN (θ, 0, Fe) = L NL N + δL S [CN (θ, 0, 0) + CS P (θ, 0, 0)],
CS P (θ, 0, Fe) = δL NL N + δL S [CN (θ, 0, 0) + CS P (θ, 0, 0)].
(16)
Figure 1 also illustrates the gap between θeN and θ
e
S . This gap in tax-
ation leads to different consumer prices of oil in the North and South:
(θeN + 1)pe > (θeS + 1)pe. This implies that the national marginal produc-
tivities of oil are not equalized. Global output could be increased if a
larger share of oil were used in the North, where its marginal productiv-
ity is higher. The equilibrium allocation of oil between North and South is
therefore inefficient.
Our model features the two opposite revenue transfers described in the
introduction between developed oil consuming countries and developing
oil producing countries. The North gives foreign aid to the southern poor
and captures oil rents from the southern rich. Oil taxes are strictly higher
in the North, leading to an inefficient allocation of oil between northern
and southern firms. The following section proposes a policy coordination
mechanism aimed at reducing this inefficiency.
5. Equilibrium policies with the coordination mechanism
The inefficiency of the equilibrium described in the previous section stems
from the incentives of the North to overtax the resource in order to capture
oil rents from the resource holders. One way of correcting this inefficiency
is to reduce the incentives to capture those rents.
A reduction of the northern oil tax rate would lead to a more efficient
allocation of oil and increase global production, but the resulting revenue
increase would unevenly benefit the three groups. Resource holders’ rents
would increase while the total revenue of the northern residents and the
southern poor would decrease. As the North does not internalize resource
holders’ consumption, it has no incentives to lower its tax. However, if
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some of the resulting oil rents were redistributed to the poor population
for which the North is altruistic, it might be willing to lower the tax. This is
the basis of our coordination mechanism.
Consider the following contract proposed by the northern authorities
to the southern authorities. The contract specifies the northern tax rate θN
and the amount of national aid I (t) ≥ 0 to be transferred from the resource
holders to the southern poor.
Southern authorities will accept the contract if and only if it increases
resource holders’ utility.17 Moreover, the result that a zero tax is dominant
from the southern government’s perspective still applies, so that θcS = 0
holds. Hence, their participation constraint is
∫ ∞
0
ln(CS R(θN , 0)(t) − I (t))e−ρt dt ≥
∫ ∞
0
ln(CS R(θeN , 0)(t))e
−ρt dt. (17)
The optimal contract for the northern government solves
max
θN ,{I (t)}t≥0,{F(t)}t≥0
∫ ∞
0
L N ln
(
CN (θN , 0, F)(t)
L N
)
+ δL S ln
(
CS P (θN , 0, F)(t) + I (t)
L S
)
e−ρt dt
s.t. (17) and,∀t, F(t) ≥ 0, I (t) ≥ 0.
As I (t) enters the North’s utility function with a positive sign, the South’s
participation constraint will be binding. This implies that all the oil rents
resulting from the decrease in the northern oil tax will be redistributed to
the poor: ∀t , I (t) = CS R(θN , 0)(t) − CS R(θeN , 0)(t). Thus, I (t) grows at the
same rate as all the other variables and the North’s optimization problem
is reduced again to the date zero utility maximization.
We denote the optimal contract by (θcN , (I
c(t))t≥0) and the optimal level
of foreign aid when the contract is used by Fc(t).
Proposition 3. Equilibrium policies with the coordination mechanism satisfy the
following properties:
1. Coordination improves global efficiency: θcN < θ
e
N and θ
c
N = 0 if δ ≥ δ.
2. Internal redistribution is always positive and foreign aid is positive if
the North is sufficiently altruistic: I c > 0, and Fc > 0 if δ > δ.
Proof. See the online Appendix.
Proposition 3 shows that the constraint I (t) ≥ 0 (which is equivalent
to θcN ≤ θeN , since CS R(θN , 0)(t) is decreasing in θN ) is never binding. This
17 Although it is more reasonable to assume that southern authorities accept the
contract only if it strictly increases their utility, we will follow the convention that
the participation constraint extends to equality. Hence, when this constraint will
be binding, it should perhaps be interpreted as almost binding.
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Figure 2. Equilibrium policies with the coordination mechanism
means that the North can always obtain a strictly higher payoff by using
the contractual coordination instrument. The reason for this is the follow-
ing. Without the contract, the North captures some of resource holders’
rents by overtaxing the resource at the expense of its own competitiveness,
while helping the southern poor with lump sum foreign aid. By transfer-
ring oil rents to the southern poor, the contract allows the altruistic North
to benefit from oil rents, while increasing its own competitiveness. It is a
more efficient revenue redistribution scheme.
At the altruism threshold rate δ, the optimal contractual tax rate in the
North becomes nil and the possibility of revenue redistribution through the
contract is exhausted. If northern altruism is greater than this threshold,
foreign aid is used to complement the redistributive role of the contract.
We show in the online Appendix that δ is given by δ =
[Csp(0,0,0)+CS R(0,0)−CS R(θ,0)]/L S
CN (0,0,0)/L N . When δ > δ, the level of foreign aid F
c
splits the net revenue of the northern workers and the southern poor,
CN (0, 0, 0) + CS P (0, 0, 0) + [CS R(0, 0) − CS R(θ, 0), according to the weight
of each group in the northern citizen’s utility function:
CN (0, 0, Fc)
= L N
L N + δL S [CN (0, 0, 0) + CS P (0, 0, 0) + CS R(0, 0) − CS R(θ, 0)],
CS P (0, 0, Fc)
= δL S
L N + δL S [CN (0, 0, 0) + CS P (0, 0, 0) + CS R(0, 0) − CS R(θ, 0)].
Figure 2 illustrates the North’s choice of these instruments in the case
where δ < δ.
Proposition 3 shows that the coordination instrument restores global
efficiency, i.e. θcN = θcS when the North is sufficiently altruistic, i.e., when
δ > δ.
It is worth noting that the complete restoration of efficiency stems from
the use of an additional instrument by a strategic agent (the northern gov-
ernment), who is not benevolent – in particular, who does not care about
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the welfare of the oil owners. This result is surprising18 and it deserves
some particular attention. It can be explained in the following way. The
contract allows the northern government to manipulate the split of world
output between the different groups. We show in the online Appendix that
when the contract is used by a sufficiently altruistic North, its optimization
problem amounts to maximizing global output Y minus a fixed rent that
cannot be captured, which is oil owners’ consumption in the absence of the
contract, CS R(θ, 0). Since the North is led to maximize world output minus
a fixed quantity, it is not willing to introduce distortional taxes that would
decrease world output.
Beyond the improvement of global efficiency shown in Proposition 3, let
us examine the effects of the contract on the welfare of each group. The wel-
fare of the North is obviously improved by the availability of an additional
instrument.19 Resource holders’ welfare is unchanged as their participation
constraint is binding. The contract has three effects on the consumption of
the southern poor. First, it decreases their wages because some of the final
good production moves to the North. Second, it decreases the amount of
foreign aid they receive. Third, it introduces a positive amount of national
aid. Proposition 4 shows that the overall effect on their revenue is always
positive.
Proposition 4. The introduction of the coordination mechanism leads to a Pareto
improvement of the equilibrium allocation.
Proof. See the online Appendix.
The coordination mechanism suggested in this paper improves global
efficiency and welfare. It offers a more efficient redistribution scheme to
help the poor living in oil exporting countries. Although this solution has
good properties, it relies on a theoretical model that abstracts from some
real world issues which are discussed in the following section.
6. Discussion
The above analysis has shown that the interactions between rich oil con-
suming countries and poor oil producing countries via oil taxation and
foreign aid policies results in an inefficiency of the oil allocation. This inef-
ficiency arises because the possibility of capturing oil holders’ rents by
18 A known example in which a strategic agent is led to maximize total welfare is
that of a monopoly perfectly discriminating between consumers, since in that case
the monopoly is able to capture the entire surplus. In our case, however, the strate-
gic northern government is not able to capture the entire surplus but only a part
of it.
19 The effect of the contract on the northern government’s budget cannot be estab-
lished. On the one hand, the tax decrease may induce fiscal revenues to decrease.
On the other hand, the aid decrease entails a reduction in expenditures. In our set-
ting, the counterpart of the net budgetary effects is the adjustment of lump sum
transfers so that the government’s budget constraint is always satisfied.
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northern oil taxation induces the northern government to overtax oil; this
tendency is magnified by the northern altruism towards the poor in the oil
producing region, even when oil taxation coexists with foreign aid transfers
in favor of the latter.
The possibility of correcting this inefficiency through the coordination
mechanism described in section 5 is theoretically interesting for two rea-
sons. First, it highlights that the source of the economic problem is a lack of
coordination between the two regions. Second, while our abstract setting
focuses on the main features of the problem, the corrective contract on the
North’s initiative may serve as a basis for more realistic proposals.
In the current context, no mention of oil taxes can avoid a discussion
of their environmental dimension. This will be done briefly below; as we
will argue, the mechanism of the contract of section 5 must survive envi-
ronmental considerations absent from the setting of this paper. Some other
real world issues absent from our theoretical model are worth discussing:
credibility of the redistribution of oil rents by the southern government,
recipient targeting, donor coordination, transparency, transfer visibility
and transaction costs. This will be done thereafter.
For reasons that were unrelated to environmental concerns,20 the US
Congressional office suggested in 1986 the idea of lowering the tariff on
oil imported from some low-income countries. In that proposal, there was
no condition on the redistribution of the resulting extra-rents within these
countries. More recently, Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003) suggested
that oil revenues in Nigeria be equally shared among the whole popula-
tion, but without specifying any compensation for the elite monopolizing
the oil rents. The mechanism of section 5 combines the ideas of lowering
oil taxes with a better redistribution of the oil rents, but it further takes into
account the interests of all groups involved, thus introducing the necessity
of political feasibility.
Our theoretical analysis also abstracts from global pollution externali-
ties caused by oil consumption. Would our coordination mechanism still
be welfare improving if environmental concerns are taken into account?
First, in the presence of a global quantity based environmental regulation,
to which industrialized countries seem to give priority, taxes should not
pursue any environmental objective and our analysis would carry over
without any further adjustment.
Otherwise, were oil taxes set in order to pursue this environmental objec-
tive, the same forces as in the present paper would be at work: oil-poor
countries would still tend to tax at higher levels than oil-rich countries. This
is the message delivered by Amundsen and Scho¨b (1999) and Daubanes
and Grimaud (2010). As emphasized in the latter paper, in a Hotelling
model the environmental effect of oil taxes depends on their dynamic pat-
tern, while global efficiency requires homogeneous after-tax price levels.
A globally efficient allocation of polluting inputs is always a prerequisite
to environmental efficiency. More generally, as long as marginal damages
20 The objective of that proposal was to avoid poor countries’ inability to meet their
debt payments.
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from oil use are independent of where oil is consumed, the price unicity
principle must hold. Thus, overtaxation by northern countries, for what-
ever reasons,21 can still be corrected by the contractual mechanism at the
root of section 5. Were the optimal level of oil taxation strictly positive,22
the mechanism should target it, instead of a zero level as in section 5. The
intuition survives as long as the gap between regions’ taxes offers efficiency
gain from tax convergence. This may not necessarily imply the convergence
of northern taxation to the southern level. Whether a contractual solution
of this kind can induce southern regions, if taxing at suboptimal levels,
to increase their taxes, is a more intricate question that we leave unex-
plored. Efficiency gains from tax convergence, again, leave opportunities
to provide such incentives, though.
The theoretical interest of contractual mechanisms should not hide the
practical difficulties of such solutions. In the following paragraphs, we
discuss critical assumptions of our analysis and argue that coordination
mechanisms of the kind introduced in section 5 are not devoid of practical
relevance.
Our framework assumes that the additional oil rents resulting from
lower taxes in the North will effectively be redistributed to the poor pop-
ulation in the oil exporting country. This is a strong assumption given the
poor institutions and non-representative governments of many oil export-
ing countries. In a dynamic contract setting, this commitment problem
could be overcome given the repeated nature of donor–recipient interac-
tions. If industrialized countries lowered oil tax rates and observed that the
resulting oil revenues in the South did not benefit the poor population, they
could always go back to the non-coordinated equilibrium policies. This
credible threat may be sufficient to induce southern authorities to respect
their redistribution commitments.
There is another consideration. Observability is always an issue, not
only under contractual schemes, but also, and in much the same way,
under any form of foreign aid destined to a particular group. Hence,
the efficiency gains from coordination are irrespective of the degree of
observability.
An important issue absent from our two-country model is the targeting
of recipients. While foreign aid can easily be targeted to a recipient, lower-
ing oil taxes in a world with several oil exporting countries would enrich
all such countries and not only those that the donor is willing to favor. Tar-
geting low-income countries could be implemented by lowering tariffs on
oil originating from those countries exclusively.
Symmetrically, our one-donor–one-recipient model focuses on the neces-
sity of coordination between donor and recipient policies. However, coor-
dination between different donors is not less important. A unilateral
21 Daubanes and Lasserre (2011) show that a government in need of raising com-
modity tax revenues must target non-renewable resources as a priority.
22 While absent in Daubanes and Grimaud’s (2010) Hotelling analysis, endogeneity
of reserves would make the level of taxation relevant for environmental policy as
this level would discourage extraction.
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decrease in oil taxes by one industrialized country may have little effect
on the equilibrium oil price and it may create oil price gaps with other
industrialized countries, leading to other distortions. The issue of donor
coordination deserves more attention in future research.
In this paper, taxes and aid are collected and redistributed at no cost.
In reality, these transfers entail non-negligible costs of public funds. While
a second-best setting would blur the main message that coordination can
improve efficiency, it is worth noting the following. If costs of public
funds increased with the amount of taxes collected and redistributed, then
contractual coordination mechanisms, by reducing those amounts, would
further have the benefit of reducing transaction costs.
Relatedly, since policy coordination also reduces foreign aid transfers, it
makes international redistribution less visible. Visibility may matter, espe-
cially if the motivation of foreign aid is not purely altruistic. To overcome
this problem, the amounts indirectly transferred through contractual mech-
anisms such as the one suggested here could be included in some extended
definition of foreign aid.
7. Conclusion
This paper points out the inefficiency that arises when oil importing donor
countries (North) and oil exporting recipient countries (South) interact
through oil taxation and foreign aid policies. In the absence of coordina-
tion, the North overtaxes oil use with a view to capturing rents from the oil
owners in the South. The northern tendency to overtax oil is magnified by
its willingness to redistribute oil rents to the poor population in the South
via foreign aid. The gap between oil taxes in the North and in the South
entails a global distortion of the allocation of oil.
We show how a well-designed policy coordination mechanism reduces
this inefficiency. It consists of a contract proposed by the northern author-
ities to the southern authorities, by which the former lower oil taxes and
the latter redistribute the resulting oil rents to the poor. This coordination
mechanism increases global output by reducing distortions in the alloca-
tion of oil. A larger share of oil is used by the final sector firms in the
North, where its productivity is higher. The opposite revenue transfers
between North and South are reduced, while revenue redistribution from
southern rich to southern poor is increased. Northern workers earn higher
direct revenues due to the improved competitiveness of northern firms;
they earn lower fiscal revenues from oil taxation and they redistribute less
foreign aid to the southern workers. Oil owners earn higher rents, but they
redistribute them to the southern poor. Southern poor earn lower direct
revenues and receive less foreign aid, but they benefit more from the oil
rents. We show that the introduction of such a coordination mechanism is
Pareto improving.
By drawing attention to the efficiency gains of coordination between oil
importing donor countries and oil exporting recipient countries, this paper
is intended to inspire future research on policy coordination mechanisms.
In particular, it would be interesting, both from a theoretical and a policy
perspective, to further examine the benefits of such coordination schemes
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when account is taken of oil polluting character as well as of heterogeneity
among donors and among recipients, of asymmetries of information and
of commitment problems.
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